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ZONING BOARDS OF ADJUSTMENT AND
VARIANCES: CALIFORNIA IMPOSES A
FINDINGS REQUIREMENT
Until recently, the issue whether a local zoning board was required
to make findings and give reasons when granting a variance re-
mained unresolved by the California courts. Although substantial
evidence must support the award of a variance to insure that legis-
lative standards have been satisfied,2 there had been no judicial
determination whether the board must always set forth findings nor
an explication of the relationship between the evidence and findings
and between the findings and the ultimate board decision. In
Topanga Association for a Scenic Community v. County of Los
Angeles3 the Supreme Court of California held that local zoning
boards are required to make findings supported by reasons when
granting a variance. The court reversed the lower court decision
upholding a denial of a writ of administrative mandamus to require
a county board of supervisors to vacate an order awarding a variance. 4
The variance had been recommended by the zoning board, granted
1. In theory a variance is a permit granted by the board of adjustment to
allow a departure from the zoning law under certain conditions. Reps, Discre-
tzonary Powers of the Board of Zoning Appeals, 20 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
280, 280-81 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Reps]. It "is not a matter of right" but
rather "a special privilege with the burden of proof resting upon the applicant."
Bowden, Article XXVIII-Opening the Door to Open Space Control, 1 PACIFIC
L.J. 461, 505 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Bowden]. "If a variance is granted,
it is [only] to bring the disadvantaged property up to . . . [the] reasonable use
enjoyed by other neighboring property." D. HAGMAN, J. LARSON & C. MARTIN,
CALIFORNIA ZONING PRACTICE 269 (1969) [hereinafter cited as HAGMAN]. The
public interest is protected by standards that prohibit the granting of a variance
inconsistent with the purpose and intent of the zoning legislation. 2 R. ANDER-
SON, AMiERICAN L kw OF ZONING § 14.38 (1968) [hereinafter cited as ANDER-
SON].
2. See, e.g., Siller v. Board of Supervisors, 58 Cal. 2d 479, 375 P.2d 41, 25
Cal. Rptr. 73 (1962); Bradbeer v. England, 104 Cal. App. 2d 704, 232 P.2d
308 (Dist. Ct. App. 1951).
3. 11 Cal. 3d 506, 522 P.2d 12, 113 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1974).
4. Id. at 510, 522 P.2d at 14, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
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by the county regional planning commission, and upheld by the
county board of supervisors. 5
Plaintiffs challenged the variance on the ground that it was not
supported by sufficient evidence. Prior to determining the propriety
of the variance, the court announced guidelines for judicial review
of a challenged variance. Findings are to be set forth, regardless
of whether such findings are required by the local ordinance.0 Be-
fore sustaining the grant of a variance, a reviewing court must de-
termine from the board record that substantial evidence supports
the findings and that the findings in turn support the decision, re-
solving reasonable doubts in favor of the board.7 Applying these
guidelines, the court concluded that the findings were insufficient
to satisfy the legislative requirements for a variance and reversed
and remanded with directions to issue the requested relief.8
Until 1966 no California appellate court had ever reversed a local
zoning board decision awarding a variance.9 Two reasons for this
5. The variance had been granted for the establishment of a mobile home
park on 28 acres of property that had been zoned for light agriculture and
single-family residences with a minimum lot size of one acre. Plaintiff was a
nonprofit organization of taxpayers and real property owners in Topanga Can-
yon, where the mobile home park was to be situated, and opposed the variance
from the beginning of the local action. Id.
6. A local ordinance required findings by the zoning board. Id. at 514 n.11,
522 P.2d at 16 n.11, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 840 n.11.
7. Id. at 514, 522 P.2d at 16, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 840. The court noted that
in some land use cases a court might apply a different standard of review-
that of conducting an independent determination of the evidence. It was held
in Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Ass'n, 11 Cal. 3d 28,
520 P.2d 29, 112 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1974), that when a local administrative
agency renders a decision that substantially affects a "fundamental vested right"
and a challenge is made as to whether the findings are supported by the evi-
dence, the court must make an independent review of the evidence. Petitioners
did not assert that this standard was applicable in Topanga, and the court
indicated that it did not find any "fundamental vested right" affected. 11 Cal.
3d at 510 n.1, 522 P.2d at 14 n.1, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 837 n.1; see note 1 supra.
Professor Hagman believes that the Strumsky decision has ."profound implications"
for local land use decisions and litigation. Hagman, Judicial Review of Local
Land-Use Decisions in California, 26 LAND Usn L. & ZONING DxOwsT No. 5, at
8 (1974). See also Disco, The Implications of Strumsky and Topanga for Judicial
Review of Zoning Decisions, 50 CALIF. S.B.J. 26 (1975).
8. 11 Cal. 3d at 518-22, 522 P.2d at 19-22, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 843-46.
9. HAGMAN, supra note 1, at 264; Gaylord, Zoning: Variances, Exceptlons
and Conditional Use Permits in California, 5 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 179, 182 n.27,
196. (1958). Gaylord reported that the only case known to him in which a
variance had been set aside was Beloin v. Blankenhorn, No. 560,288 (Super.
Ct., County of Los Angeles, 1951).
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result were the presumption of validity accorded the board's decision
and the limited scope of judicial review over zoning board decision-
making. The courts readily presumed that the administrative'0
board, in granting a variance, made appropriate findings based upon
substantial evidence." The effectiveness of judicial review was ham-
pered by the failure to require that the board issue the findings and
reasons that supported its decision.1 2 Given the presumption of
10. A variance is an administrative matter. Johnston v. City of Claremont,
49 Cal. 2d 826, 838, 323 P.2d 71, 78 (1958). A variance is a quasi-judicial
rather than a legislative matter. Allen v. Humboldt County Bd. of Supervisors,
241 Cal. App. 2d 158, 163, 50 Cal. Rptr. 444, 448 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
See generally 3 ANDERSON, supra note 1, § 14.67; HAGOMAN, supra note 1, §
7.19.
11. Bowden, supra note 1, at 507. The presumption was that an "official
duty ha[d] been regularly performed." Miller v. Planning Comm'n, 138 Cal.
App. 2d 598, 602, 292 P.2d 278, 281 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956). See also Bringle
v. Board of Supervisors, 54 Cal. 2d 86, 89, 351 P.2d 765, 767, 4 Cal. Rptr.
493, 495 (1960). The presumption was based on § 1963(15) of the Civil Pro-
cedure Code, now CAL. EvID. CODE § 664 (Deering 1966).
12. Thus, in effect, the presumption was virtually irrebuttable, and courts
upheld the administrative action despite an empty or meager record of the
board proceedings. Comment, Judicial Control over Zoning Boards of Appeal:
Suggestions for Reform, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 937, 948 (1965) [hereinafter cited
as Comment, Judicial Control over Zoning Boards of Appeal]. See Bartholomae
Oil Corp. v. Seagar, 35 Cal. App. 2d 77, 94 P.2d 614 (Dist. Ct. App. 1939),
upholding a setback variance despite the city council's failure to put findings
in its record when a local ordinance called for a "complete report" to be made.
The court inferred from the variance approval itself that findings had been
made and declined to impose a requirement of formal findings. See also Charles
L. Harney, Inc. v. Board of Permit Appeals, 195 Cal. App. 2d 442, 15 Cal.
Rptr. 870 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961), in which the court declared that had findings
been made they would be reviewable, but that the presumption of validity
arises whether or not there is a record of the administrative proceedings.
Another court said that the "granting [of a variance] . . . is fully within the
discretion of the . . . board, and that . . . decision is not reviewable by the
courts unless there is illegality in the proceedings." Phil Anthony Homes, Inc.
v. City of Anaheim, 175 Cal. App. 2d 268, 272, 346 P.2d 231, 234 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1959). In one case a court upheld a provision in a local ordinance that
the decision of the board was final as "perfectly proper." Steiger v. Board of
Supervisors, 143 Cal. App. 2d 352, 357, 300 P.2d 210, 214 (Dist. Ct. App.
1956). But cf. Niskian v. City of Long Beach, 103 Cal. App. 2d 749, 752, 230
P.2d 156, 158 (Dist. Ct. App. 1951), in which the court, in reviewing the
proceedings of a city council denial of a permit to move a structure over city
streets, stated: "In proceedings of this kind, quasi-judicial in nature, witnesses
should be sworn and examined, and a record made, upon which reviewing
courts may be enabled to determine whether substantial evidence was or was
not considered by the quasi-judicial body. The proceedings should be conducted
in a quasi-judicial manner at least."
1975]
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validity and the limited scope of review, it became nearly impossible
to successfully challenge a variance award. Even when administrative
findings were made, the courts held that the board need only state
ultimate facts as a condition to granting a variance.13 Board decisions
could be reversed only for fraud or abuse of discretion 14 and evidence
of abuse of discretion had to be "dear and convincing."10 When a
record was submitted to the court, it was reviewed according to the
substantial evidence test,21 but the presumption of validity restricted
the court's application of the test.'7 The situation was not signifi-
cantly different with respect to administrative denials of variances. 8
In 1966, however, a California district court of appeal reversed a
variance award by a city board of permit appeals, using the sub-
stantial evidence test to determine whether the board record evidenced
13. See, e.g., Kappadahl v. Alcan Pac. Co., 222 Cal. App. 2d 626, 35 Cal.
Rptr. 354 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Ames v. City of Pasadena, 167 Cal. App. 2d
510, 334 P.2d 653 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959). The "ultimate facts" doctrine meant
that the board could merely repeat the legislative standards of the ordinance
and declare that they had been met. HAGMAN, supra note 1, at 288; Comment,
Zoning: Variance Administration in Alameda County, 50 CALIF. L. Rav. 101, 107
& n.44 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Zoning].
14. See, e.g., Phil Anthony Homes, Inc. v. City of Anaheim, 175 Cal. App.
2d 268, 346 P.2d 231 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Flagstad v. City of San Mateo,
156 Cal. App. 2d 138, 318 P.2d 825 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
15. See, e.g., Siller v. Board of Supervisors, 58 Cal. 2d 479, 375 P.2d 41, 25
Cal. Rptr. 73 (1962); Ames v. City of Pasadena, 167 Cal. App. 2d 510, 334
P.2d 653 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
16. See cases cited note 2 and accompanying text supra.
17. Under the substantial evidence rule, the court decides questions of law
but limits itself to the test of reasonableness in reviewing findings of fact. 4 K.
DAVIs, ADmINISTRATrVE LAw TREATISE § 29.01 (1958) [hereinafter cited as
DAvis].
The California situation led one writer to the conclusion that "the thinner
the record the more likely the zoning board's action will be sustained." Com-
ment, judicial Control over Zoning Boards of Appeal, supra note 12, at 949.
"[T]here is no case so lacking in the necessary factual requisites that a variance
might not be granted." Gaylord, supra note 9, at 196. Variances have been
relatively easy to obtain in California.
Because the law regarding variances is fairly often applied less stringently
than is required by statutory and ordinance provisions, an attorney who
advises a client not to seek a variance on the ground that the legal standards
would not be met is possibly denying his client a variance that would be
granted. On the other hand, . . . an unhappy client who opposed his neigh-
bor's variance would seldom be advised to take the matter to court. The
prospect of a successful court challenge was virtually nonexistent.
HAGMAN, supra note 1, at 264.
18. See HAGMAN, supra note 1, at 287; Bowden, supra note 1, at 507. See,
e.g., City of San Marino v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 180 Cal. App. 2d 657,
4 Cal. Rptr. 547 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
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compliance with the legislative requirements.'0 Less than a year later,
the Supreme Court of California reversed the grant of a variance for
the first time.20 Since both cases dealt with a chartered city and
local law requiring that findings be made, subsequent cases cited
these as distinguishing factors.2 1 Thus, until the Topanga decision,
no general requirement existed in California that findings and
reasons be made by the board.22 With the Topanga decision, how-
19. Cow Hollow Improvement Club v. Board of Permit Appeals, 245 Cal.
App. 2d 160, 53 Cal. Rptr. 610 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
20. Broadway, Laguna, Vallejo Ass'n v. Board of Permit Appeals, 66 Cal. 2d
767, 427 P.2d 810, 59 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1967). The board that granted the
variance "purported to comply with the planning code by setting forth its find-
ings with respect to all five code conditions." Id. at 772, 427 P.2d at 813, 59
Cal. Rptr. at 149. The trial court, relying on prior case law, had "deemed
itself powerless" to upset the administrative decision. Id. The Broadway court
held that:
The presumption that an agency's rulings rest upon the necessary findings
and that such findings are supported by substantial evidence . . . does not
apply to agencies which must expressly state their findings and must set
forth the relevant supportive facts ...
[Tihe variance order may be sustained only if the board's findings suffice
to establish compliance with all of the statutory criteria and are supported
by substantial evidence in the record.
Id. at 773, 427 P.2d at 814, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 150. Both the Broadway and
Topanga opinions were written by Justice Tobriner.
21. A chartered city is not governed by state statutory standards for issuing
a variance. See CAL. GovTr CoDE § 65803 (Deering 1974). Language in the
Broadway opinion indicated judicial reliance on the local zoning ordinance's
requirement that findings be made. 66 Cal. 2d at 772, 427 P.2d at 814, 59
Cal. Rptr. at 150.
22. Decisions between Broadway and Topanga resulted in different methods
for applying the substantial evidence test. Broadway was followed when a
chartered city or other political subdivision required findings to be made with
respect to zoning decisions. See Stoddard v. Edelman, 4 Cal. App. 3d 544, 84
Cal. Rptr. 443 (Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (chartered city); Robison v. City of
Oakland, 268 Cal. App. 2d 269, 74 Cal. Rptr. 17 (Dist. Ct. App. 1968)
(chartered city); Tush v. Board of Supervisors, 262 Cal. App. 2d 279, 68
Cal. Rptr. 505 (Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (county); TIoss v. Board of Zoning
Adjustment, 262 Cal. App. 2d 1, 68 Cal. Rptr. 320 (Dist. Ct. App. 1968)
(chartered city). If there was no specific requirement, the courts distinguished
Broadwa'. See, e.g., Delta Rent-a-Car Sys., Inc. v. City of Beverly Hills, 1
Cal. App. 3d 781, 787-88, 82 Cal. Rptr. 318, 323 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969). See
also HAOMAN, supra note 1, at 290; Bowden, supra note 1, at 509. If findings
were made but were not required by the ordinance, there was an indication that
a court would apply Broadway. See Hamilton v. Board of Supervisors, 269 Cal.
App. 2d 64, 75 Cal. Rptr. 106 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969). See also AIAN, Supra
note 1, at 471; Bowden, supra note 1, at 508.
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ever, California adopted the majority view that variances be sup-
ported by findings.M
Generally, under the majority view, the findings and record of the
board are subject to judicial review to determine "whether the board
acted within its jurisdiction, whether the standards imposed by
statute or ordinance were respected, whether the procedural rights
of the litigants were observed, and whether the board was charge-
able with any abuse of discretion." 24 In some instances, it has been
held that a board is powerless to deal with variances unless it can
make findings of fact.25 The courts in a few states, however, have
declined to impose a findings requirement absent statutory provision.20
Various methods are employed to impose a findings requirement.
In Topanga the court based its conclusion on an interpretation of
a California statute providing for administrative mandamus that
structures the procedure for judicial review of adjudicatory decisions
23. See, e.g., Ward v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 153 Conn. 141, 215 A.2d 104
(1965); Mavrantonis v. Board of Adjustment, 258 A.2d 908 (Del. 1969);
Dietrich v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 293 A.2d 470 (D.C.
App. 1972); Kaczorowski v. Elmhurst Chicago Stone Co., 10 Ill. 2d 582, 141
N.E.2d 14 (1957); Kunz v. Waterman, 283 N.E.2d 371 (Ind. 1972); Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 260 A.2d 434 (Me. 1970); Kennerly
v. Mayor & City Council, 247 Md. 601, 233 A.2d 800 (1967); Prusik v. Board
of Appeal, 262 Mass. 451, 160 N.E. 312 (1928); Gougeon v. Board of Adjust-
ment, 52 N.J. 212, 245 A.2d 7 (1968); Collins v. Behan, 285 N.Y. 187, 33
N.E.2d 86 (1941); Van Meter v. H.F. Wilcox Oil & Gas Co., 170 Okla. 604,
41 P.2d 904 (1935); Robinson v. Town Council, 60 R.I. 422, 199 A. 308
(1938); Burkhardt v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 192 Va. 606, 66 S.E.2d 565
(1951); State ex rel. Morehouse v. Hunt, 235 Wis. 358, 291 N.W. 745 (1940).
See 3 ANDERSON, supra note 1, § 16.41; 8A E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL COR-
PORATIONS § 25.272 (3d ed. 1965); C. RHYNE, MUNICIPAL LAW § 32-22 (1957);
2 E. YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE § 15-17 (3d ed. 1965).
24. 3 ANDERSON, supra note 1, § 16.41, at 241.
25. See, e.g., Metzger v. City of San Antonio, 384 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1964); L.M. Pike & Son, Inc. v. Town of Waterford, 130 Vt. 432, 296
A.2d 262 (1972).
26. See, e.g., Deardoff v. Board of Adjustment of the Planning & Zoning
Comm'n, 254 Iowa 380, 118 N.W.2d 78 (1962); Creten v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 204 Kan. 782, 466 P.2d 263 (1970). For a discussion of the situation
in Kansas see Note, Judicial Review of Special Use Permits in Kansas, 11
WASHBURN L.J. 440, 447 (1972). Illustrative of the uncertain situation in
California after Broadway, the author reads the decision as imposing a findings
requirement. Id. at 447 n.49.
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rendered by administrative agencies.27 The court inferred that the
legislature intended the administrative decision to be supported by
findings because of the statutory focus2s on the "relationships be-
tween evidence and findings and between findings and ultimate
action.",'
The methods by which courts require that findings be made by
a local zoning board fall into two categories: (1) application of a
27. CAL. CIV. PRo. CODE § 1094.5 (Deering 1973). Use of the statute is a
proper method for seeking review of a variance. Allen v. Humboldt County
Bd. of Supervisors, 220 Cal. App. 2d 877, 882, 34 Cal. Rptr. 232, 235 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1963). This remedy can be distinguished from a writ of mandamus,
which is not proper. Rubin v. Board of Directors, 16 Cal. 2d 119, 104 P.2d
1041 (1940). On the scope of remedy, the Allen court declared:
Although the Administrative Procedure Act provides for the use of the writ
of mandate to review the proceedings of certain administrative agencies
• . . . the remedy of administrative mandamus and the procedure relative
to it prescribed by . . . section 1094.5 are not limited to agencies enumerated
in the Administrative Procedure Act or those adopting the procedures of
the act, but are applicable to any administrative agency . . . both statewide
and local ....
220 Cal. App. 2d at 882, 34 Cal. Rptr. at 235. See generally 3 ANDERSON,
supra note 1, § 22.01. In Topanga the court discussed the applicability of §
1094.5. 11 Cal. 3d at 514 n.12, 522 P.2d at 17 n.12, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 841
n.12.
28. In particular, the court placed heavy emphasis on subsections (b) and (c)
of § 1094.5.
(b) The inquiry in such a case shall extend to the questions whether
the respondent has proceeded without, or in excess of jurisdiction; whether
there was a fair trial; and whether there was any prejudicial abuse of dis-
cretion. Abuse of discretion is established if the respondent has not pro-
ceeded in the manner required by law, the order or decision is not supported
by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence.(c) Where it is claimed that the findings are not supported by the evidence,
. . . abuse of discretion is established if the court determines that the findings
are not supported by substantial evidence in the light of the whole record.
CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1094.5 (Deering 1973).
29. 11 Cal. 3d at 515, 522 P.2d at 17, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 841. Cf. Friends
of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 761 (1972), in which a question arose whether the word "found" in a
local ordinance required specific written findings. In its discussion the court
referred to an earlier case, Schumm v. Board of Supervisors, 140 Cal. App. 2d
874, 295 P.2d 934 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956), which held that written findings
were not required. The Mammoth court concluded that the Broadway decision
may have undermined the effect of Schumm and that the meaning is a question
of legislative intent. 8 Cal. 3d at 270, 502 P.2d at 1064-65, 104 Cal. Rptr. at
776-77.
The Topanga court went on to give several policy arguments to support its
conclusion. See notes 38-49 and accompanying text infra. It is worth noting
that the requirements concerning administrative findings stem primarily from
judge-made law. 2 DAvis, supra note 17, § 16.01.
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legislative findings requirement, or (2) imposition of such a require-
ment by judicial authority. When a statutory requirement is found,
it is usually embodied in the state zoning enabling act as a procedural
requirement-0 or in provisions setting variance standards," rather
than within the state administrative procedure act. When the re-
quirement is judicially imposed, the courts have declared it to be
either an essential ingredient to performance of the judicial func-
tion 32 or a requirement of procedural due process.3 3 While contro-
versy exists over which basis is stronger for judicial imposition of
the requirement, 34 findings are necessary for meaningful judicial
30. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-13-11 (Smith-Hurd 1962); 3
ANDERSON, supra note 1, §§ 16.27, 16.41. See also Comment, Judicial Control
over Zoning Boards of Appeal, supra note 12, at 947-48.
31. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 4468 (1975).
32. See, e.g., Zieky v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 151 Conn. 265, 196
A.2d 758 (1963). It is not always an easy task for a court to impose a findings
requirement. One court resorted to a 60-year-old case for support. See Stoll
v. Gulf Oil Corp., 79 Ohio L. Abs. 145, 155 N.E.2d 83 (Hamilton County C.P.
1958).
33. See, e.g., A. Dicillo & Sons, Inc. v. Chester Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 44
Ohio Op. 44, 59 Ohio L. Abs. 513, 98 N.E.2d 352 (Geauga County C.P. 1950).
The court stated that it was a fundamental principle of due process that ad-
ministrative agencies amplify their decisions with findings of fact and legal
conclusions and that boards of zoning appeals are similarly obligated. Id. at 47,
59 Ohio L. Abs. at 518, 98 N.E.2d at 356. See also Morris v. City of Catletts-
burg, 437 S.W.2d 753 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969).
The Dicillo case may also be read as being in the category of an essential
ingredient to the performance of judicial duty, since the court looked to the
Ohio Appellate Procedure Act which required the board to produce a record
including findings of fact so that the material could be reviewed by the court in
the proper role of appellate review. 44 Ohio Op. at 48, 59 Ohio L. Abs. at 519,
98 N.E.2d at 356.
34. At one time the United States Supreme Court adopted a due process
view concerning findings by administrative agencies, but Professor Davis notes
that the Court has moved away from that position and he supports such a
departure. 2 DAvis, supra note 17, at §§ 16.01, 16.04. The basis for Davis'
view is that at times courts can make decisions without findings, so it does not
follow that administrative agencies should be subjected to a findings requirement
on constitutional due process grounds. He suggests that most statutory require-
ments are merely codifications of judge-made law and that the requirement is
based upon practical reasons aimed at promoting orderly functioning of the
process of review.
Some writers advance strong arguments for the due process view, especially
for imposing the requirement on zoning administrative boards because of the
informality of the procedure, the nature of their membership (lacking the ex-
pertise of federal administrators and the law conditioning of judges) and the
lack of public or judicial scrutiny over their actions. Dukeminier & Stapleton,
The Zoning Board of Adjustment: A Case Study in Misrule, 50 Ky. L... 273,
[Vol. 10:349
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review."
The standard test for review is whether the administrative body
abused its discretion.5z The scope of the inquiry is defined in terms
of "substantial evidence," "rational basis," or some other nebulous
phrase. These notions do not function effectively in reviewing zon-
ing decisions such as variances3 7 because the substantial evidence
332-33 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Dukeminier]. The authors circumvent Pro-
fessor Davis' objection by relying on state constitutions, which state courts may
interpret to require more extensive procedural guarantees.
For a recent California decision that held that findings were constitutionally
required under due process see In re Sturm, 11 Cal. 3d 258, 521 P.2d 97, 113
Cal. Rptr. 361 (1974). The case dealt with informal proceedings of a parole
board and the petitioner claimed absence of written findings was unfair.
35. The courts have become rather insistent that zoning boards state the
grounds for their action so that in the event of review the court might have
no doubt as to the boards' reasons for their decisions. 2 YOKLEY, supra note
23, k 15-47.
36. "[W]here the only function of the court is to determine whether or not
some administrative body has abused the broad discretion given it by a statute
or ordinance authorized under a state enabling act, the court will only evaluate
the decision of the administrative body insofar as it is reasonable (or unreason-
able) on the facts ....... Note, Judicial Remedial Action in Zoning Cases:
An Emerging Standard for Review, 1973 URBAN L. ANN. 191, 193. The standard
has been described as based on (1) the doctrine of separation of powers, as admin-
istrative bodies are historically part of the executive branch; (2) the court's in-
ability to conduct independent investigation into the actions of administrative
bodies; and (3) the doctrine of the exhaustion of administrative remedies. Id.
at 193-94.
37. Two problems that emerged in zoning administration of variances were
abuse of discretion by the zoning board and the limited scope of judicial review
of such abuse. What developed was at odds with the theoretical function of
the zoning board in the administration of variances. See note 1 supra. "The
variance procedure was not designed for the purpose of giving planning flexibility
but for the purpose of alleviating unique hardship." Dukeminier, supra note 34,
at 341.
Studies of local boards have disclosed that variances were often granted liber-
ally and in disregard of legislative standards. See, e.g., id. at 291; Reps, supra
note 1, at 294; Comment, Zoning, supra note 13, at 107. The board was supposed
to be a "safety valve" in zoning administration when granting variances, but it
came to be known as a "leaky boiler." Reps, supra note 1, at 281. The authors of
one study of a zoning board disclosed several reasons for the problems that devel-
oped: issues were not sharply drawn; legal standards were not followed; findings
of fact were not made; and duties and responsibilities were misinterpreted. Duke-
minier, supra note 34, at 322-37. Lack of controls over the board, particularly
judicial, were identified as a primary cause of this result. Variances often went
unchallenged, and even applicants who were denied a variance seldom appealed.
This result at the administrative level, plus the presumption of the validity of the
decision, further limited judicial control. Id. at 277; Comment, Judicial Review
of Zoning Administration, 22 CLEV. ST. L. Rnv. 349, 354, 356 (1973); Comment,
Judicial Control over Zoning Boards of Appeal, supra note 12, at 949.
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and rational basis tests assume that the reviewing court is sup-
plied with a record of the board's action. Zoning boards of
adjustment often proceed informally, however, and records of their
action are frequently incomplete. 38 Also, because "[t]he courts have
recognized that the standards for granting variances must necessarily
remain general since the variance is designed to meet situations that,
by definition, cannot be defined and resolved in advance of the
ordinance,"3 9 the vagueness of legislative standards has created op-
portunity for misuse. The remedy has been tightened procedural
requirements, rather than redefined standards for variances.10
One such procedural requirement is that the board make findings
and give reasons to support its decisions so that a reviewing court
can check abuse of discretion.41 Findings have also been advocated
to assure that substantive uniformity of decisions authorizing vari-
ances is achieved. A findings requirement encourages board members
38. See 3 ANDERSON, supra note 1, §§ 16.01, 16.27; Dukeminier, supra note
34, at 331; Comment, judicial Control over Zoning Boards of Appeal, supra
note 12, at 949. One court held that a prima facie case of arbitrariness on the
part of the board was established because no record was made, and no findings
or reasons were given. Zylka v. City of Crystal, 283 Minn. 192, 167 N.W.2d
45 (1969).
39. Note, Administrative Discretion in Zoning, 82 IAv. L. Rav. 668, 671
(1969). See also Comment, judicial Review of Zoning Administration, supra
note 37, at 352; Comment, Judicial Control over Zoning Boards of Appeal,
supra note 12, at 937.
40. See, e.g., MODEL LAND Day. CODE § 2-304 (Proposed Official Draft
No. 1, 1974).
41. Some writers saw this as the first step in solving the problem. E.g., Com-
ment, judicial Control over Zoning Boards of Appeal, supra note 12, at 952.
See 3 ANDERSON, supra note 1, § 16.41; Shapiro, The Zoning Variance Power
-Constructive in Theory, Destructive in Practice, 29 MD. L. REv. 3, 13-14
(1969). See generally Bowden, supra note 1, at 509; Note, Judicial Review of
Special Use Permits, supra note 26, at 447.
Generally, the findings required of the board are more comprehensive than
those required of trial courts, and judicial recognition of strong practical rea-
sons for administrative findings is universal. 2 DAvis, supra note 17, § 16.01.
The practical reasons as seen by Professor Davis, are "facilitating judicial re-
view, avoiding judicial usurpation of administrative functions, assuring more
careful administrative consideration, helping parties plan their cases for rehearings
and judicial review, and keeping agencies within their jurisdiction." Id. § 16.05.
See Robey v. Schwab, 307 F.2d 198, 202 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Saginaw Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC, 96 F.2d 554, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1938). See generally 3 ANDER-
SON, supra note 1, § 16.41, at 245.
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to critically consider the evidence before them.42 Such a require-
ment could also lead to development of a reliable body of precedents,
by both the zoning board and the judiciary, concerning the interpre-
tation of the legislative standards for a variance. 43
Another purpose that has been advanced for the findings require-
ment is the preservation of the local comprehensive land use plan.
To be consistent with its theoretical objectives and legal limitations,
variance power should be exercised sparingly.44 Arguably, excessive
grants of variances erode the comprehensive land use plan and foster
citizen apathy.45 The findings requirement is to alleviate this problem
by facilitating judicial review, thus encouraging citizen vigilance in
protecting the comprehensive land use plan. Without findings the
court must search the record of the board and speculate as to the
reasons for the decision.4 6 If the board does make findings, the
42. See, e.g., Dukeminier, supra note 34, at 330-35; Note, Judicial Review
of Special Use Permits, supra note 26, at 448. See also 2 F. COOPER, STATE
AD INISTRATIVE LAW 467-68 (1965) [hereinafter cited as COOPER] (application
in administrative law generally). It has been asserted that when there are
identical board statements in decisions with widely dissimilar factual situations
unsupported by factual findings, there is sufficient showing of abuse of discretion.
Comment, Zoning, supra note 13, at 108.
43. Dukeminier, supra note 34, at 331. Creators of the variance "expected
that a system of judge-made rules would emerge to eliminate . . . vagueness"
of standards. Note, Administrative Discretion in Zoning, supra note 39, at 671.
These precedents would then be applied at the administrative level to achieve
uniformity in the decisionmaking process.
44. Arnebergh, The Functions and Duties of a Board of Zoning Adjustment, in
I INSTITUTE ON PLANNING & ZONING PROCEEDINGS 109, 118 (1961); Ford,
Guidelines for Judicial Review in Zoning Variance Cases, 58 M.Ass. L.Q. 15
(1973); Shapiro, supra note 41, at 3. The desired result of a findings require-
ment would be the fulfillment of one of the board's purposes, that of a "safety
valve." See note 37 supra.
45. See Comment, Zoning, supra note 13, at 107; Note, Administrative Dis-
cretion in Zoning, supra note 39, at 682; Note, Variance Administration in
Indiana-Problems and Remedies, 48 IND. L.J. 240, 241 (1972-73); Comment,
Judicial Control over Zoning Boards of Appeal, supra note 12, at 942. The
Topanga court gave emphasis to this view. 11 Cal. 3d at 517-18, 522 P.2d at
19, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 843. The court thought the proper judicial role was to
prevent subversion of the "zoning scheme" by the granting of excessive variances.
For an interesting comment on citizen apathy see Gaylord, supra note 9, at 196.
46. Professor Anderson believes that without findings a court must speculate
as to the credibility of the evidence in the record and determine a basis for
the decision-tasks that are "assigned to the board." 3 ANDERSON, supra note
1, § 16.41, at 242. See, e.g., Zieky v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 151 Conn.
265, 268, 196 A.2d 758, 760 (1963). See also SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S.
80, 94 (1943).
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parties will be able to determine whether and on what basis review
should be sought. Moreover, findings enable a court to pursue its
function by determining: (1) whether testimony at the hearing
affords substantial support for the findings of "basic facts"4 7 by the
agency; (2) whether the "basic facts" found to be supported by
substantial evidence reasonably support the inferences of "ultimate
facts" 418 by the agency; and (3) whether the agency correctly applied
the law to the "ultimate facts" reasonably inferred by it from "basic
facts.", 9
The problems of administrative zoning discretion and limited
judicial review have evoked additional recommendations for reform
ranging from other procedural modifications to a new approach to
zoning regulation.50 A state board of zoning review has been ad-
vanced as a remedy by several writers.- Theoretically, this agency
would serve as an intermediate step between the local boards and
the judiciary. The objective of the state review board would be to
foster uniformity of board processes, both in board procedures and
the application of legislative standards. 2 One substantive recom-
mendation is to remove the power to grant "use"9 3 variances from
the board. This variance, in contrast to an "area!' variance, is seen
as being most destructive of zoning purposes,9 4 particularly when
47. Basic facts are those on which the ultimate facts rest. They are more
detailed than ultimate facts but less detailed than a summary of the evidence.
See generally 2 DAvis, supra note 17, § 16.06.
48. Ultimate facts are usually expressed in the language of a statutory
standard. As defined by the Supreme Court, it "is a conclusion of law or at
least a determination of a mixed question of law and fact." Helvering v. Tex-
Penn Oil Co., 300 U.S. 481, 491 (1937).
49. 2 COOPER, supra note 42, at 466.
50. See Dukeminier, supra note 34, at 350, calling for a new approach to
zoning regulation.
51. See Babcock, The Unhappy State of Zoning Administration in Illinois, 26
U. C r. L. REv. 509, 538-39 (1959); Bryden, Zoning: Rigid, Flexible or Fluid?
44 J. URBAN L. 287, 301 (1967); Comment, judicial Review of Zoning Ad-
ministration, supra note 37, at 351, 357-58.
52. For a detailed discussion of the concept of a state review board see
Comment, Judicial Review of Zoning Administration, supra note 37, at 357-58.
53. A "use" variance is one which permits a use of land other than that
prescribed by the zoning regulations. 2 ANDERSON, supra note 1, § 14.06. An
"area" variance is one which does not involve a use which is prohibited by the
zoning ordinance but does involve matters such as setbacks, lot-size, yard re-
quirements, etc. Id. § 14.07.
54. Dukeminier, supra note 34, at 281; see 2 ANDERSON, supra note 1, §
14.07. See also Bryden, supra note 51, at 321.
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effective judicial controls are lacking. A use variance was at issue
in Topanga, but California now prohibits such variances by statute. 5
This approach is one way to prevent serious departures from the
comprehensive plan. Other proposals favor additional procedural
requirements to correct the informality of board hearings.5 6 Such
requirements would include stricter evidentiary rules, presence of
legal experts and court reporters, and precise rules for the hearing
process. In practice, the boards of the smaller municipalities might
be financially and functionally burdened under such a scheme.sr
Moreover, while the state review board is an innovative proposal,
the states have not moved to adopt it. Rather, the trend has been
to impose a findings requirement, as in Topanga, and other pro-
cedural modifications' s designed to clarify the role of the board and
the judiciary by facilitating judicial review.59
55. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65906 (Deering 1974), as amended, (Supp. 1975).
56. See, e.g., Reps, supra note 1, at 295; 16 SYRAcusE L. REv. 568 (1965).
The proposed ALI code embodies this approach. The section dealing with
administrative hearings details procedural guidelines for notice, right of appear-
ance, testimony and production of evidence, direct and cross-examination of
witnesses, recording of hearings, demeanor of board members, and findings.
MODEL LAND DEV. CODE § 2-304, supra note 40. The proposed code specifies
that each material finding shall be supported by substantial evidence. Id. §
2-304(12). The drafters' notes after the section indicate that the Code pro-
visions emphasize formal procedures that are judicial in nature.
57. The board, especially in the smaller municipality, is made up of non-
legal and non-land use experts. See note 34 supra.
58. The ALI drafters did not recommend that a state review board be
formed. The proposed code would merge all land use controls under one ordi-
nance to be administered by a "Land Development Agency" at the local level.
See MODEL LAND DEV. CODE, supra note 40, art. 2.
In 1968, Pennsylvania enacted a new Municipalities Planning Code in an
attempt to solve problems of zoning procedures and judicial review. The
changes, however, proved ineffective and the Code was amended in 1972 by
revising the article on procedures. Krasnowiecki, Zoning Litigation and the
New Pennsylvania Procedures, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 1029 (1972). After re-
viewing the legislative changes, Professor Krasnowiecki concludes that the new
procedures are an improvement, but that any significant impact on the character
of land use controls can only be achieved by substantive changes. He would
have local governments explicitly state their policies and standards concerning
land use controls and would consider the creation of an "expert" reviewing
agency at the state or regional level. Id. at 1156.
59. The Topanga court did not expressly decide whether the local zoning
board would also be required to issue findings when it denies an application
for a variance. Some states have given different meaning to the findings require-
ment, depending upon whether the variance was approved or denied. 3 ANDER-
soN, supra note 1, § 16.42. The state most often cited is Massachusetts because
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Whether the findings now required under Topanga are adequate
and whether to reverse or to remand when they are incomplete are
problems that remain for resolution by the California judiciary.00
The inquiry must go further if the court is dealing with a denied
variance, for then it also must decide whether to order that the
variance be granted.6' In addition, while findings may address all
the issues, they still may be merely conclusory and incomplete. The
of Ferrante v. Board of Appeals, 345 Mass. 158, 186 N.E.2d 471 (1962), and
Cefalo v. Board of Appeal, 332 Mass. 178, 124 N.E.2d 247 (1955). Judge
Ford states that this result arises out of the rule that "[a] court is not required
to make detailed findings of fact as ground for negative findings" and that the
two cases are often mis-cited and should not be read to mean that findings are
not necessary when a variance is denied. Rather, they do not need to be de-
tailed. Ford, supra note 44, at 21-24.
Since the Topanga court relied on the administrative mandamus statute as
a basis for imposing the findings requirement, it is probable that when a variance
is denied, the zoning board will need to make findings.
60. In dealing with these questions, the experience of other jurisdictions
would be helpful. On this problem generally see 3 ANDERSON, supra note 1, §§
16.41, 16.42, and cases cited therein.
"A very large portion of the cases remanded for better findings are an inevit-
able result of the system of a limited judicial review. . . . Judicial decisions
on inadequacy of administrative findings are thus one of the principal tools by
which courts impose their limited control of administrative development of law
and policy." 2 DAvis, supra note 17, § 16.01, at 436. The "General Test" for
judging the adequacy of findings is that if the findings do not allow the three
steps of the function of review, see text at note 49 supra, they are not adequate.
2 COOPER, supra note 42, at 472. On application the courts: (1) require that
the findings include the basic facts, (2) require that the findings be sufficiently
complete to make it clear that the agency considered all the relevant statutory
factors, (3) refuse to accept findings cast in terms that are too conclusory,
(4) remand findings that are too indefinite to permit the court to fulfill its
appellate functions, and (5) refuse to accept as "findings" statements that merely
summarize the evidence. Id. at 474.
61. See note 59 supra. Whether a court should order the grant of a variance
that has been denied raises questions involving separation of powers and usurpa-
tion of board functions. Judge Ford suggests a "but-for" test in deciding
whether to order a variance to be granted. Thus, a court could order a variance
granted when extraordinary circumstances are present that "compel the con-
clusion that but for [an] error of law, or arbitrary and capricious action, the
variance would or should have been granted." Ford, supra note 44, at 24.
For a discussion of suggested guidelines advanced for Massachusetts courts
with respect to the record to be prepared by the zoning board and with respect
to the scope and manner of review in variance cases see id. at 26-28. An
added feature of the Massachusetts situation is de nevo fact finding by the
trial court in variance cases. This is one way to attack the presumption of the
validity of the board's action that is not generally employed in other states in
variance cases. See 3 ANDERSON, supra note 1, § 16.41. See also note 7 supra.
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Topanga court indicated that such findings are inadequate,62 and
this conclusion is the majority view.63
The Topanga decision is significant to the extent that the principal
effect of the findings requirement will be to facilitate meaningful
judicial review of variance cases.64 The findings requirement should
produce logical and legally accurate board decisions that will provide
a clear basis for review, apprise parties whether an appeal is appro-
priate, and demonstrate to the public that administrative decision-
making is careful, reasoned and equitable. It remains an open
question whether the decision will have any real impact on the
overall quality of variance decisionmaking, since variance decisions
are not often appealed.65 While the findings requirement will pro-
vide a basis for judicial control over the administrative process, such
control will be academic unless a variance application is opposed.
Only when an administrative variance decision is appealed would
the policies of the findings requirement be adequately effectuated.
Thus it is evident that while the judiciary can ameliorate some
abuses of administrative discretion, effective control can be provided
only by the political and legislative processes.
William A. Murray
62. 11 Cal. 3d at 517 n.16, 522 P.2d at 18 n.16, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 842 n.16.
63. 3 ANDLRSON, supra note 1, § 16.44.
64. The findings requirement has been recommended by legal writers in
California. See, e.g., Comment, Judicial Control over Zoning Boards of Appeal,
supra note 12, at 952. See also Comment, Zoning, supra note 13, at 107. The
problem of the lack of judicial control over variances was of particular concern
to a joint committee of the California legislature dealing with open space control.
For a discussion by a staff member of that committee see Bowden, supra note 1.
Topanga has been followed in other areas of land use control in California
involving administrative decisions by local agencies. See Woodland Hills Resi-
dents Ass'n, Inc. v. City Council, 44 Cal. App. 3d 825, 833-39, 118 Cal. Rptr.
856, 860-64 (Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (approval of a tract map of a proposed
subdivision by advisory agency, planning commission and city council).
The Topanga decision should also be greatly appreciated by the drafters of
the proposed ALI code who hope to encourage greater judicial responsibility in
review of administrative land use decisions. The drafters noted that "[t]he
requirements of the SZEA [Standard Zoning Enabling Act] for a record, findings
and decision are rudimentary in character. The courts are no longer willing
to tolerate a decision on a mimeographed form containing findings and con-
clusions good for any occasion." MODEL LAND Dav. CODE, supra note 40, at 95.
65. See Reps, supra note 1, at 294; Shapiro, supra note 41, at 16; Note,
Variance Administration in Indiana, supra note 45, at 247 n.44; Comment,
Zoning, supra note 13, at 101.
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